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EMPHATIC PLEA FOR THE EMPATHIC JUDGE 
Justice must not only be done, it must be seen to be done. 
Thus, the contemporary orthodoxy is that the dispensation of 
justice must be dispassionate and blind, for to do otherwise is 
to risk accusations of subjectivity and bias. This article adopts 
the contrarian position – judges ought, in their decision-
making, to take full account of the different perspectives of 
the parties involved, and can only properly do so if they 
possess and exercise empathy. The prejudice-related risks 
involved in embracing empathy are acknowledged, and 
strategies for dealing with these excesses are explored. With 
that in mind, this article posits field work to identify a judge’s 
propensity towards empathy, and also the development of a 
professional programme aimed at raising awareness and 
enabling judges to apply and control empathic perspective-
taking in their adjudicatory duties. 
Gary LOW* 
LLB (Hons) (London School of Economics), BCL (Oxon), 
PhD (University of Maastricht); 
Advocate and Solicitor (Singapore); 
Assistant Professor of Law (Singapore Management University). 
I. Introduction
1 The oft-mentioned adage is that justice must not only be done,
it must also be seen to be done.1 This has traditionally been interpreted,
amongst others, as requiring the judge to exclude irrelevant
considerations, including personal biases and prejudices. Judges, after
all, “like Caesar’s wife, should be above suspicion”.2 Justice is thus
portrayed frequently as blind, paying no heed to the parties’ race or
social stature, and resulting in a judicial decision-making process that
denies all else save for cold rationality. But should the scales conceal
Justitia’s eyes? Is there no room for a humanistic response, like empathy,
* Research for this article was made possible through a grant under the Singapore
Judicial College’s Empirical Judicial Research Initiative. I thank Maartje de Visser
for comments on earlier drafts. All views expressed herein are exclusively my own.
1 R v Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy [1924] KB 256 at 259, per Lord Hewart CJ. 
Although attributing this hallowed principle to such a personality might cause 
some to blush – see J Spigelman, “Seen to be Done: The Principle of Open Justice”, 
keynote address to the 31st Australian Legal Convention Canberra 9 October 1999 
(9 October 1999). 
2 Leeson v The General Medical Council (1889) 59 LJChNS 233 at 241, 
per Lord Bowen. 
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in judicial decision-making? The answer is, perhaps, not as clear as 
initially supposed. Former US President Barack Obama sparked 
voracious debate about empathy in judges when he commented in 2009 
that the eligibility criteria for candidates to succeed then retiring US 
Supreme Court Justice David Souter had to include the ability to 
empathise.3 
2 In recent years, the language of empathy has crept in, across the 
Pacific, on an island whose legal institutions’ established reputation is 
one of efficiency rather than emotion. Unlike the fanfare and scorn with 
which it is treated in the US, empathy’s reception in Singapore’s legal 
and judicial ecosystem is something of a quiet revolution.4 Lawyers, in 
the encouragement of pro bono publico, demonstrate “an empathetic 
hearing of [the public’s] concerns”.5 As part of restorative justice 
initiatives, the Singapore Prison Service runs the Victim Empathy 
Programme, in which prisoners are encouraged to reflect on the 
consequences of their actions from the perspective of their victims.6 The 
2011 annual report of the then-Subordinate Courts of Singapore insisted 
that “showing empathy to court users” is part and parcel of its 
organisational culture.7 Indeed, its Chief Justice, Sundaresh Menon, in 
his address at the 2014 opening of the Family Justice Courts, made the 
general observation that “in some respects, the judicial task can be 
likened to that of a doctor with a focus on diagnosing the problem, 
having the appropriate bedside manner to engender and convey 
                                                          
3 See the remarks of the White House Press Secretary (1 May 2009) at 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-justice-
david-souter (accessed 8 January 2018); see also Tobin Sparling, “Resurrecting the 
Argument for Judicial Empathy: Can a Dead Duck Be Successfully Repackaged for 
Sale to a Skeptical Public?” (2010) 20 Temp Pol & Civ Rts L Rev 1, Thomas Colby, 
“In Defence of Judicial Empathy” (2012) 96 Minn L Rev 1945 and Rebecca K Lee, 
“Judging Judges: Empathy as the Litmus Test for Impartiality” (2014) 82 U Cin L 
Rev 146. To be sure, there were already academic discussions on the topic before it 
became the theme du jour: eg, Douglas Linder, “Juror Empathy and Race” 
(1996) 63 Tenn L Rev 883. 
4 The author claims no credit for associating “empathy” with a “quiet revolution”: 
see Jill Stark, “The Empathy Revolution: Fighting Crime with Compassion” The 
Sydney Morning Herald (21 February 2016). 
5 Malathi Das, “4th Southeast Asia Pro Bono Conference Mandalay, Myanmar, 
September 2015: Keynote Address – Further Developing the Pro Bono Legal 
Culture and Structure in the Region”, Singapore Law Gazette (March 2016) at p 18. 
6 Singapore Prison Service, Annual Report 2015: Collaboration, at p 87 <http://www. 
sps.gov.sg/docs/default-source/publication/spsannual_lowres_revised.pdf> (accessed 
2 May 2016). 
7 Subordinate Courts of Singapore, Annual Report 2011: Greater Heights, New 
Horizons, at p 3 <https://www.statecourts.gov.sg/Resources/Documents/Annual 
Report2011.pdf> (accessed 2 May 2016). 
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empathy, and the wisdom to choose the right course of treatment to 
bring about healing” [emphasis added].8 
3 Latching onto this last comment, it would appear that empathy 
is beginning to be en vogue amongst stakeholders in Singapore’s judicial 
system, though without there being a concomitant deliberate debate 
about its merits. Indeed, just such a discussion ought to take place; this 
is since the role empathy ought to play in the meting out of justice is a 
question of public interest. Should judges reject the mercurial influence 
of empathy, espousing cold formal rationality in order to preserve 
certainty and predictability? Or, should empathy provide that necessary 
human(e) counterbalance to law’s formalistic propensity towards 
mechanical rigidity?9 Translated into more concrete terms: should our 
judges display empathy? If so, should empathy be part of the criteria for 
judicial appointments? Differences in opinion to these questions could, 
of course, also be seen as proxies for disagreements regarding the role of 
judges – and, thereby, the function of judicial decision-making – in any 
given legal system. 
4 Such unanswered questions are important to engage with, and 
provide a foretaste of the gap in the discussion which this article seeks to 
fill. It does so in the following manner. Part II addresses and debunks 
the ideal of the rational objective judge. Part III springboards from the 
premise of the boundedly rational judge to introduce empathy as a 
concept and means to perfect judicial decision-making. In part IV, the 
major objections to the use of empathy are discussed and diffused, 
ultimately resulting in support for the view that judicial empathy in the 
form of perspective taking ought to be part and parcel of judicial 
decision-making. Part V maps out an empirical research agenda on 
identifying empathic traits in judges as well as incorporating empathy in 
judicial training. Part VI concludes. 
                                                          
8 Sundaresh Menon CJ, opening address at the Opening of the Family Justice Courts 
(1 October 2014) at para 24 https://www.familyjusticecourts.gov.sg/NewsAndEvent/
Documents/2014Oct01_Keynote_OpeningFJCourts.pdf (accessed 2 May 2016). 
9 Martin Hoffmann, “Empathy, Justice and the Law” in Empathy: Philosophical and 
Psychological Perspectives (Amy Coplan & Peter Goldie eds) (Oxford University 
Press, 2011); John Deigh, “Empathy, Justice, and Jurisprudence” (2011) 49 The 
Southern Journal of Philosophy 73. 
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II. The Laplacean rational judge does not exist 
5 While the notion of rationality has had a long and steady grip 
on the legal domain,10 it is neoeconomics’ standard of perfect rationality 
that has dominated the scene in recent years,11 positing that the 
Laplacean12 judge sets about his task “with cold, rational precision”.13  
He is that mythical quasi-Platonic philosopher-king systematically 
sifting through evidence and facts with ruthless efficiency and applying 
legal rules coldly to achieve objectively fair outcomes. Of course this 
should be the case. As Richard Posner pointed out, judges are but 
“ordinary people responding rationally to ordinary incentives”.14 Judges 
make decisions on a “judicial utility function”,15 analogous to an 
economic cost–benefit analysis.16 This is the modern guise of the 
Hobbesian judge as one “divested of all fear, anger, hatred, love and 
compassion”.17 That the judicial process reaches efficient and rational, 
                                                          
10 See Paul Freund, “Rationality in Judicial Decisions” in Rational Decision (Carl 
Friedrich ed) (Aldine Transaction, 2007), Chaïm Perelman, “Disagreement and 
Rationality” in Droit, Morale et Philisophie (1968) at p 103, Pablo T Spiller, 
“Rationality, Decision Rules, and Collegial Courts” (1992) 12 International Review 
of Law and Economics 186, Arthur Stinchcombe, “Reason and Rationality” in The 
Limits of Rationality (Karen Schweers Cook & Margaret Levi eds) (University of 
Chicago Press, 1990) and Claire Finkelstein, “Legal Theory and the Rational Actor” 
in Oxford Handbook of Rationality (Alfred Mele & Piers Rawling eds) (Oxford 
University Press, 2004). 
11 This was forcefully argued in Robin West, “The Anti-empathic Turn” in Passion 
and Emotions (James Fleming ed) (NYU Press, 2013). 
12 See Peter Todd & Gird Gigerenzer, “Précis of Simple Heuristics That Make Us 
Smart” (2000) 23 Behavioral and Brain Sciences 727 at 729. The adjective 
“Laplacean” is a reference to the Enlightenment philosopher Pierre-Simon-
Laplace, who described an all-knowing and all-seeing intelligence. Gigerenzer used 
the term “demon” in its original Greek sense to denote a superior or supernatural 
entity, instead of one that embodies evil. 
13 Darrell A H Miller, “Iqbal and Empathy” (2010) 78 U Mo-Kan City L Rev 999 
at 1007. 
14 Richard A Posner, “What Do Judges and Justices Maximise?: (The Same Things 
Everybody Else Does)” (1993) 3 Sup Ct Econ Rev 1. 
15 Richard A Posner, How Judges Think (Harvard University Press, 2008). 
16 For an empirical defence of the rational choice model of judicial decision-making, 
see Lee Epstein, William M Landes & Richard A Posner, The Behaviour of Federal 
Judges: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Rational Choice (Harvard University 
Press, 2013). For a forceful rebuttal, see Charles M Cameron & Lewis 
A Kornhauser, “Rational Choice Attitudinalism” (2017) 43 European Journal of 
Law and Economics 535. 
17 Thomas Hobbes, “Leviathan or the Matter, Forme and Power of a Common-
Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil” (1651) ch XXVI. 
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objectively justifiable outcomes, is a claim made by both common law18 
and civilian jurists.19 
6 Epistemologically, subjectivity is inevitable: “[judgments] are 
the result of an act of decision by the judicial decision maker … [T]he 
objective character ascribed to the logical schema of judicial syllogism is 
revealed to be specious, because the premises of such a logical inference 
are the result of unavoidable subjective choices”.20 If this is true, then all 
judgments are necessarily subjective. However, as Richard Wasserstrom 
pointed out, jurists are able to reconcile this tension by drawing a 
distinction between the decision-making process, which is admittedly 
subjective, and the decision itself, manifested in the form of the written 
judgment, which can be justified independent of judge’s state of mind.21 
7 Indeed, one of the litmus tests for impartiality in the judicial 
decision-making process is the duty for judges to give reasons. In so 
                                                          
18 See, eg, Lewis A Kornhauser, “Adjudication by a Resource-Constrained Team: 
Hierarchy and Precedent in a Judicial System” (1995) 68 S Cal L Rev 1605 and 
“Modeling Collegial Courts I: Path-Dependence” (1992) 12 International Review of 
Law and Economics 169. 
19 See Max Weber, Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society (Max Rheinstein ed; 
Max Rheinstein & Edward A Shils trans) (Harvard University Press, 1954) at p 307; 
Anthony Kronman, Max Weber (Stanford University Press, 1893) at p 89; consider 
also Karl Wurzel, “Methods of Juridical Thinking” in Science of Legal Method: 
Select Essays by Various Authors (Ernest Bruncken & Layton B Register trans) (The 
MacMillan Company, 1921) at p 298; an overview is provided by Terry 
A Maroney, “Emotion and the Discourse of Judging” in The Emotional Dynamics 
of Law and Legal Discourse (Heather Conway & John Stannard eds) (Hart 
Publishing, 2016). 
20 Christopher Grey, The Philosophy of Law: An Encyclopedia (Taylor & Francis, 
1999) at p 455, in reliance on Hans Kelsen, Essays in Legal and Moral Philosophy 
(Dordrecht Reidel, 1973) ch 9, at p 228. 
21 Richard Wasserstrom, The Judicial Decision: Towards a Theory of Legal 
Justification (Stanford University Press, 1961) at p 25: 
One kind of question asks about the manner in which a decision or 
conclusion was reached; the other inquires whether a given decision or 
conclusion is justifiable. That is to say, a person who examines a decision 
process may want to know about the factors that led to or produced the 
conclusion; he may also be interested in the manner in which the conclusion 
was to be justified. 
 For an excellent discussion on Wasserstrom’s observation, see Claudio Michelon, 
Practical Wisdom in Legal Decision-Making (University of Edinburgh School of 
Law Working Paper No 2010/13, 2010): “[t]hat distinction allows the theorist to 
admit that decisions reached by legal decision-makers are subjective, while also 
claiming that the justification process can be understood objectively. In that way, 
objectivity is preserved and subjectivity in legal decision-making is explained 
away”; see also Klaus Mathis & Fabian Diriwächter, “Is the Rationality of Judicial 
Judgements Jeopardized by Cognitive Biases and Empathy?” in Efficiency, 
Sustainability and Justice to Future Generations (Klaus Mathis ed) (Springer, 2011) 
at p 67. 
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doing, the judge is made accountable to both litigants as well as society 
at large that the decision so reached is done logically, systematically, as 
well as rationally.22 This is underscored by the celebrated Australian 
judgment of McHugh JA in Soulemazis v Dudley, in which he 
emphasised the provision of reasons as the “hallmark of a judicial 
decision” without which there is nothing to separate it from complete 
and utter arbitrariness.23 Thus former Chief Justice Chan Sek Keong 
insists that judgments are assessed “from the careful examination of 
exact rationale and methodology”.24 Agreeing with these sentiments, the 
Singapore Court of Appeal in Thong Ah Fat v Public Prosecutor 
declared that:25 
[A] legal decision will … be deprived of many of its illocutionary 
forces if no sufficient reason is stated[. Today, it] cannot be justified 
solely by the judge’s statement of belief that it is right, without 
providing any explanation as to why it is so. The days when it sufficed 
for a judge to say ‘because I say so’ are well behind us … 
8 Be that as it may, advances in the realm of law and psychology 
cast doubt over the sufficiency of the mere duty to give reasons 
regarding the soundness of the judicial decision. How a person cognates 
(that is, thinks) – or whether matters are attended to specifically or 
peripherally – can be divided into two main processes, and this is now 
widely accepted under the label of dual-processed theory.26 Processes 
may be distinguished into those which are “rapid, parallel and automatic 
in nature” (that is, system 1).27 System 2 refers to the deliberate use of 
                                                          
22 Patrick Neill, “The Duty to Give Reasons: The Openness of Decision-Making” in 
Christopher Forsyth & Ivan Hare, The Golden Metwand and the Crooked Cord: 
Essays in Honour of Sir William Wade QC (Oxford University Press, 1998). 
23 Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 247 at 279, 
per McHugh JA. 
24 Chan Sek Keong, “Securing and Maintaining the Independence of the Court in 
Judicial Proceedings” (2010) 22 SAcLJ 229 at 249, citing in support Christopher 
M Larkins, “Judicial Independence and Democratisation: A Theoretical and 
Conceptual Analysis” (1996) 44 Am J Comp L 605. 
25 [2012] 1 SLR 676 at [17]. 
26 See Daniel Kahneman, “Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioural 
Economics” (2003) 93 The American Economic Review 1449 at 1452: “the 
automatic operations of perception and the deliberate operations of reasoning”; see 
also Steven A Sloman, “The Empirical Case for Two Systems of Reasoning” (1996) 
119 Psychological Bulletin 3 and Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, 
“Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment” in 
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment (Thomas Gilovich, Dale 
W Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds) (Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
27 See generally Jonathan Evans, “In Two Minds: Dual-Process Accounts of 
Reasoning” (2003) 7 Trends in Cognitive Sciences 454. While there may be 
individual differences of opinion amongst theorists, there appears to be a general 
consensus on the nature of the systems: cf Michael W Eysenck & Mark T Keane, 
Cognitive Psychology: A Student’s Handbook (Psychology Press, 2010), eg, the two 
systems are not “autonomous homunculi”, but are instead “collections of processes 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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our analytical faculties. It is in this sense relatively slower, conscious and 
deductive. The mind has limited capacity not only to deliberately think 
things through, but also to store information in its working memory to 
aid in such decisional processes. The severity of the mental load brought 
to bear on our cognition has consequences for man’s conduct. The 
complexity of the task at hand, the (un)familiarity of the situation, the 
expertise of the person, and whether there are irrelevant pieces of 
information distracting him from the task all contribute to whether: he 
is able to efficiently and accurately come to a decision; or, as a result of 
these factors, he takes into account irrelevant factors or focuses on 
peripheral issues and arrives at an erroneous or poor decision. It is a 
result of these demands imposed on man’s cognitive limitations, the 
Nobel laureate Herbert Simon posited that man seeks not to maximise 
his utility but instead to “satisfice”.28 We simply have make do with what 
we have. 
9 How does our mind process the mountains of information 
before it and deal adequately with the many tasks at hand? It develops 
mental rules-of-thumb known as heuristics to help with judgment and 
decision-making. These are essentially known as system 1 processes. 
Using them allows for quick decisions to be arrived at with relatively 
little burden on cognitive resources. It is the frequent and predictable 
misapplication of system 1 processes which corrupts the decision-
making processes and leads to erroneous decisions. These 
misapplications are known as “biases” and which, in other words, 
“prevent or distort rational calculation”.29 
10 Perhaps we want to be able to say that none of these is true of 
judges – judges: are (s)elected precisely for their phenomenal intellectual 
and rational capacities; and trigger their deliberative system 2 faculties 
rather than their system 1 mental shortcuts when it comes to judicial 
decision-making. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey Rachlinski and Andrew 
Wistrich (one of whom is a judge himself) conducted a series of 
                                                                                                                               
that are distinguished by their speed, controllability, and the contents on which 
they operate”; cf Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, “Representativeness 
Revisited: Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment” in Heuristics and Biases: 
The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment (Thomas Gilovich, Dale W Griffin & Daniel 
Kahneman eds) (Cambridge University Press, 2002) at p 51. 
28 This is a portmanteau of the words “satisfaction” and “suffice”: see Herbert 
A Simon, “A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice” (1955) 69 The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 99 and Herbert Simon, “Rational Choice and the Structure of 
the Environment” (1956) 63 Psychological Review 129. 
29 James A Fanto, “Quasi-rationality in Action: A Study of Psychological Factors in 
Merger Decision-Making” (2001) 62 Ohio St LJ 1333 at 1343; see also Amos 
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, “Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases” (1974) 185 Science 1124 and Jeffrey J Rachlinski, “Gains, Losses, and the 
Psychology of Litigation” (1996) 70 S Cal L Rev 113. 
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experiments on a group of practising judges, which led them to assert 
that “[e]mpirical evidence suggests that even highly qualified judges 
inevitably rely on cognitive decision-making processes that can produce 
systematic errors in judgment”.30 An associated line of research advances 
the proposition that, judges reason backwards31 and their decisions are 
culled from intuition or “judicial hunches”.32 
11 At this juncture, it becomes clear that Wasserstrom’s distinction 
between the subjective and objective is unpersuasive. In spite of the fact 
that judgments can be: (a) independently and objectively justifiable; and 
(b) although seemingly, the result of a rule-based application of the law 
to the facts, judgments can also and at the same time be based on errors 
of judgment or prejudice.33 This should obviously trouble us, but why 
should it come as a surprise? Judges are, after all, human.34 
12 It surely is a perversion of justice if judges, whether innocently 
or deliberately, misinterpret or ignore relevant information and take into 
account legally irrelevant ones. How then can one resolve this? If we 
accept that subjectivity is inevitable in the judicial decision-making 
process, then, from the discipline which first highlighted the problem 
comes also its potential solution35 – empathy. 
                                                          
30 Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J Rachlinski & Andrew J Wistrich, “Inside the Judicial Mind” 
(2001) 86 Cornell L Rev 777 at 779; see also Chris Guthrie, “Misjudging” (2007) 
7 Nev LJ 420. 
31 David Lyons, “Legal Formalism and Instrumentalism – a Pathological Study” 
(1981) 66 Cornell L Rev 949. 
32 Andrew J Wistrich, Jeffrey J Rachlinski & Chris Guthrie, “Heart versus Head: Do 
Judges Follow the Law or Follow Their Feelings?” (2015) 93 Tex L Rev 855; Diana 
Richards, “When Judges Have a Hunch: Intuition and Experience in Judicial 
Decision-Making” (2016) 102 Archiv für Rechts-und Sozialphilosophie 245. 
33 Frederick Schauer, “Do Cases Make Bad Law?” (2006) 73 U Chi L Rev 883, but 
contrast Elizabeth Sherwin, “Judges as Rule Makers” (2006) 73 U Chi L Rev 919. 
34 See Jerome Frank, “Are Judges Human? – Part One: The Effect on Legal  
Thinking of the Assumption That Judges Behave Like Human Beings” (1931)  
80 U Pa L Rev 17; see also Chad M Oldfather, “Judges as Humans: Interdisciplinary 
Research and the Problems of Institutional Design” (2007) 36 Hofstra L Rev 125. 
Consider the tongue-in-cheek remarks of Australian Judge Elizabeth Gaynor at a 
debate held at the Essoign Club (31 August 2006) on this precise topic: 
Judge Gaynor argued that once she had become a judge she had ceased being 
a human and had transformed into a celestial being – St Elizabeth of Gaynor. 
She had acquired the virtue of St Elizabeth of Hungary, and proceeded to sing 
songs of adulation to the Court of Appeal, the Chief Justice and the Chief 
Judge. She made life on the County Court seem far from dull. 
35 This much is briefly suggested in Darrell A H Miller, “Iqbal and Empathy” 
(2010) 78 U Mo-Kan City L Rev 999, although neither advanced nor developed: 
“[i]f empathy is in fact essential for more accurate decision making, then it 
suggests a far more ambitious project than this Essay can develop”: at 1012. 
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III. Empathy in judicial decision-making 
13 Our modern understanding of “empathy” as part of the English 
language comes from Edward Titchener, who himself translated the 
term from the German “Einfühlung”.36 The concept itself is much older, 
of course.37 It was dealt with at considerable length by Adam Smith in 
The Theory of Moral Sentiments before he wrote his seminal Wealth of 
Nations.38 It is as old as Aristotle.39 
14 Modern scholarship on the subject is confusing, contributed 
chiefly by divergent or overlapping meanings of empathy. In one recent 
review, up to 43 distinct conceptual definitions were identified.40 A first 
line of research posits that empathy is an umbrella term for associated 
concepts like sympathy,41 compassion, and emotional contagion;42 and 
this is because all these concepts could have broadly in common sharing 
of feelings between one another. A second line of research focuses on 
empathy as a phenomenon that influences both the cognitive and 
affective processes in the mind. Cognitive empathy refers to 
understanding another person’s perspective. Affective empathy refers 
feeling another person’s emotions.43 A third line of research focuses on 
                                                          
36 Lauren Wispé, “The Distinction between Sympathy and Empathy. To Call Forth a 
Concept, a Word Is Needed” (1986) 50 Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 314. 
37 Ezra Stotland et al, Empathy, Fantasy and Helping (SAGE Publications, 1978). 
38 As Adam Smith argued, in relation to how members of a society ought to judge 
each other: 
[T]he [judge] must, first of all, endeavor, as much as he can, to put himself in 
the situation of the other, and to bring home to himself every little 
circumstance of distress which can possibly occur to the sufferer. He must 
adopt the whole case of his companion with all its minutest incidents; and 
strive to render as perfect as possible, that imaginary change of situation. 
 See also Martha C Nussbaum, Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and Public 
Life (Beacon Press, 1997) at p 72. Therefore, in applying this view to the role of the 
judge, it is clear that Smith would have intended a decision-making process not 
devoid of empathetic information, but one that is informed by it. 
39 When Aristotle first employed the term empathy (“ἐμπάθεια”), he intended to have 
readers experience the intense sensations of a coward imagining the approaches of 
his mortal enemy. This makes sense, since at its root are the words “in” (“ἐν”) and 
“pathos” (“πάθος”); and so empathy conveys a state of “feeling into”. 
40 Benjamin Cuff et al, “Empathy: A Review of the Concept” (2016) 8 Emotion 
Review 144. 
41 This is to describe the understanding and especially influence of the other’s 
emotional state without necessarily sharing that emotional state. 
42 That is to say, empathy as an automatic affective or emotional response, feeling as 
the other feels: see Norma D Feshbach & Kiki Roe, “Empathy in Six and Seven-
Year-Olds” (1968) 39 Child Development 133 and Douglas Watt, “Towards a 
Neuroscience of Empathy: Integrating Affective and Cognitive Perspectives” 
(2007) 9 Neuropsychoanalysis 119. 
43 This is exemplified by Helene Borke, “Interpersonal Perception of Young Children: 
Egocentrism or Empathy?” (1971) 5 Developmental Psychology 263. 
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the behavioural consequences of empathy, mostly in the way of altruism. 
Some studies deny that experiencing empathy translates into a 
particular outcome.44 Others establish that prosocial behaviour precedes 
empathy, or that such behaviour was only possible due to also 
experiencing sympathy. A good reason to reject the misimpression that 
empathy results in prosocial behaviour is that the understanding of 
others’ emotions can be abused by psychopaths to manipulate victims or 
businessmen to outmanoeuvre their competitors. A fourth line deals 
with whether empathy is something that is automatically triggered or 
can be controlled by our cognitive faculties. Neuroscientific studies 
show that, upon the right stimuli, feelings of empathy can automatically 
be triggered. At the same time, we can use our cognitive processes to 
control empathy by changing the way we perceive another person, not 
thinking about the situation, or suppressing one’s emotions. 
15 Proponents of empathic judging tend to be allied exclusively to 
the view of empathy as perspective-taking. This is a good thing since not 
doing so means only the judge’s one-sided perspective is taken into 
account. “[E]mphatic induction helps individuals recognize more 
nuanced, situational narratives that are distinct from their own”45 and in 
accordance with the notion of the judge as umpire, his decisions are fair 
if and only if all relevant information is taken into account in the 
rendering of it.46 It is, thus, that Thomas Colby advanced the proposition 
that only empathic perspective-taking helps resolve who ought to 
prevail “because the legal question at issue often cannot be answered 
without understanding the way in which the litigants will be impacted 
by the decision”.47 
                                                          
44 Hector Betancourt, “An Attribution-Empathy Model of Helping Behavior: 
Behavioral Intentions and Judgments of Help-Giving” (1990) 16 Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin 573; William L Marshall, Stephen M Hudson, R Jones & 
Yolanda Maria Fernandez, “Empathy in Sex Offenders” (1995) 15 Clinical 
Psychology Review 99. Yet, studies have linked empathy to pro-social behavior and 
attitudes: see C Daniel Batson, “Empathy-Induced Altruistic Motivation”, draft of 
lecture/chapter for Inaugural Herzliya Symposium on “Prosocial Motives, 
Emotions, and Behavior” (24–27 March 2008). In other words, having empathy 
seems to suggest altruistic conduct or result in cooperation: see, eg, Taya 
R Cohen & Chester A Insko, “War and Peace – Possible Approaches to Reducing 
Intergroup Conflict” (2008) 3 Perspectives on Psychological Science 87. 
45 Jill D Weinberg & Laura Beth Nielson, “Examining Empathy: Discrimination, 
Experience, and Judicial Decisionmaking” (2012) 85 S Cal L Rev 313 at 350. 
46 See Bruce Wever, “Umpires v Judges” New York Times (11 July 2009), but contrast 
Aaron S J Zelinsky, “The Justice as Commissioner: Benching the Judge-Umpire 
Analogy” (2010) 119 Yale LJ Online 113. 
47 Thomas Colby, “In Defence of Judicial Empathy” (2012) 96 Minn L Rev 1945 
at 1965; contrast Susan A Bandes, “Empathetic Judging and the Rule of Law” 
[2009] Cardozo Law Review De Novo 133. 
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16 Keyword searches of emotive language in judgments in the 
Singapore legal database throw up dozens and dozens of cases.48 Indeed, 
across the diverse legal field, one finds examples of judges taking into 
account the perspective of the litigants before the courts. 
17 Thus, for instance, in constitutional law, doing so is implicit in 
the task of balancing fundamental rights protection. Consider the cases 
where the right of free speech of defendant litigants was pit, in the 
context of the rules on defamation, against the reputation of the 
plaintiffs. Amongst others, the court places itself in the shoes of the 
injured party to assess the relative importance of and harm to his political 
reputation, which could be why in this particular context, there are more 
limits placed on free speech than there otherwise would be.49 In 
Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v Lee Kuan Yew,50 the court involved the 
particular perspective of the injured party in advancing the proposition 
that the law in that instance ought to be sensitive to protecting the 
reputation of “honourable men” like the plaintiff to avoid deterring 
them from seeking high office. Consider also the implicit rejection of 
the constitutional equal protection clause in awarding enhanced 
damages taking into account, once again, the high office held by 
defendants in cases like Goh Chok Tong v Chee Soon Juan (No 2).51 
18 Consumer law also provides neat examples. Exemption clauses 
are unenforceable under the Unfair Contract Terms Act52 unless the 
party relying on them is able to satisfy the test of reasonableness. What 
is reasonable is highly fact-dependent, and the courts have a list of 
factors to consider, including the bargaining position of the parties and 
whether one of the parties is vulnerable. In Kenwell & Co Pte Ltd v 
Southern Ocean Shipping Co Pte Ltd,53 faced with the lack of evidence 
satisfying the reasonableness test, the judge attempted to step into the 
shoes of the defendant54 to understand whether it was possible to justify 
the validity of the contractual term in question, before ruling that the 
clause was invalid. 
                                                          
48 The Singapore Academy of Law’s LawNet database was used in June 2016 for a 
general keyword search limited to reported cases. These include “happy” 
(393 cases), “angry” (155 cases), “sad” (88 cases), “sympathise” (76 cases), 
“empathise” (10 cases), etc. The author adds that this is a simplistic search that may 
at the same time be over and under-inclusive. 
49 For the constitutional law perspective, see Thio Li-Ann, “Between Apology and 
Apogee, Autonomy: The ‘Rule of Law’ Beyond the Rules of Law in Singapore” 
[2012] Sing JLS 269. 
50 [1992] 2 SLR 310 at [64] and [65]. 
51 [2005] 1 SLR 573 at [72]. 
52 Cap 396, Rev Ed 1994. 
53 [1998] 2 SLR(R) 583. 
54 See Kenwell & Co Pte Ltd v Southern Ocean Shipping Co Pte Ltd [1998] 
2 SLR(R) 583 at [52] to [54]. 
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19 Such is also evident in the law of contract: where V K Rajah J (as 
he then was) in his typically methodical analysis, approached the 
question of the doctrine of mistake by stepping into the shoes of the 
plaintiff (specifically, as a 29 year-old business and technology degree 
graduate) to ascertain whether it was possible for him to innocently 
believe that the online offer made was a genuine one or whether he must 
have known it was a mistake on the part of the defendant electronics 
webshop.55 
20 Compare also the judicial approach in BNJ v SMRT Trains Ltd,56 
regarding the standard of care in the tort of negligence. The judge in 
that case put himself in the position of the defendant train operator to 
ascertain whether it took reasonable steps to mitigate possible risks and 
dangers to its customers at the stations it operated. This much is implied 
when, in absolving the defendant of a breach of the duty of care, he said, 
“more can always be done when it comes to safety. That is particularly so 
when safety is analysed with the perfect vision of hindsight”.57 
21 In Hii Chii Kok v Ooi Peng Jin London Lucien,58 a case regarding 
medical negligence, the Court of Appeal had occasion to redefine the 
standard of care a doctor owed his patient in relation to the provision of 
medical advice. The court rejected in part the English authority of 
Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee,59 according to which 
the requisite standard of care takes into account only the views of the 
medical profession: “it is the court that must be the ultimate arbiter of 
the adequacy of the information given to the patient, and in reaching its 
decision, it would be illogical not to adopt … the perspective of the 
patient” [emphasis added].60 Explaining why, the court noted in the 
context of a doctor’s provision of information he knows is important to 
the patient in question, that the inquiry on the standard of care “should 
be undertaken essentially from the perspective of the patient, because 
the autonomy of the patient, who has an interest in being furnished with 
sufficient information, in terms of both quantity and quality – to allow 
him to arrive at an informed decision as to whether to submit to the 
proposed therapy or treatment, demands nothing less”.61 
22 In Singapore Medical Council v Wong Him Choon,62 a 
construction worker suffered fractures to his right hand from a 
                                                          
55 Chwee Kin Keong v Digilandmall.com Pte Ltd [2004] 2 SLR 594. 
56 [2014] 2 SLR 7. 
57 BNJ v SMRT Trains Ltd [2014] 2 SLR 7 at [92]. 
58 [2017] 2 SLR 492. 
59 [1957] 1 WLR 582. 
60 Hii Chii Kok v Ooi Peng Jin London Lucien [2017] 2 SLR 492 at [125]. 
61 Hii Chii Kok v Ooi Peng Jin London Lucien [2017] 2 SLR 492 at [132]. 
62 [2016] 4 SLR 1086. 
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workplace accident. The respondent diagnosed him and performed 
surgery, discharged him two days later, and certified him fit for “light 
duties” for a month thereafter. A week later, the worker was re-admitted 
to hospital for 19 days due to intense pain suffered. Following a 
complaint by a charity for migrant workers, the respondent was charged 
for professional misconduct in failing to discharge his duty of care 
towards the worker in certifying inadequate hospitalisation leave and 
inappropriately certifying that the worker was fit for light duties at work. 
23 Andrew Phang JA exhorted the need for a doctor to display 
“care and common humanity”.63 In so doing, what is required from the 
doctor is therefore perspective-taking: or, in other words, empathy. This, 
his Honour explained, quoting from Harper Lee, is because “[y]ou never 
really understand a person until you consider things from his point of 
view … until you climb into his skin and walk around in it”.64 Although 
this comment concerns perspective-taking by the doctor, in requiring 
the doctor to display empathy, and judging whether he sufficiently did 
so, the court is itself obliged to conduct perspective-taking in relation to 
both the patient and the doctor. This can be seen by the court’s and 
disciplinary tribunal’s emphasis that the doctor had to establish whether 
conditions were adequate for the construction worker’s rest and 
rehabilitation for the duration of the medical leave given, and whether 
and what “light duties” could be given in the context of the construction 
worker’s job. The fact that the doctor did not enquire about these issues 
demonstrated a lack of empathic perspective-taking, and which 
therefore led to a finding that the doctor fell short of the standard of 
care expected of a medical professional.65 
24 Within the realm of criminal law, one observes instances where 
judges do take the perspective of the accused in assessing both 
culpability and sentencing. Referring to Public Prosecutor v Chee Cheong 
Hin Constance,66 Ho Hock Lai pointed out that although “the judge 
rightly condemned her action and punished her for it[,] what is 
especially praiseworthy was how he kept firmly in his sight, and made us 
see, the humanity in Constance Chee” [emphasis added].67 
25 In the same vein, acts of mercy by the court are worth 
mentioning. In Chng Yew Chin v Public Prosecutor,68 Rajah J (as he then 
                                                          
63 Singapore Medical Council v Wong Him Choon [2016] 4 SLR 1086 at [5]. 
64 Singapore Medical Council v Wong Him Choon [2016] 4 SLR 1086 at [4]. 
65 Singapore Medical Council v Wong Him Choon [2016] 4 SLR 1086 at [55] and [62]. 
66 See Public Prosecutor v Chee Cheong Hin Constance [2006] 2 SLR 24 on culpability 
and [2006] 2 SLR 707 on sentencing. 
67 Ho Hock Lai, “Virtuous Deliberation on the Criminal Verdict” in Law, Virtue and 
Justice (Amalia Amaya & Ho Hock Lai eds) (Hart Publishing, 2013) at p 251. 
68 [2006] 4 SLR 124. 
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was) decided that “the sentence meted out to a seriously ill offender … 
must strike the right balance between the administering of an 
appropriate sentence on the one hand and allowing a very seriously ill 
person to live out his remaining days with dignity in peace on the other. 
The exercise of mercy calls for sound but finely tuned discretion”, pithily 
quoting from Shakespeare that “the quality of mercy is not strained” by 
substituting for a fine both the defendant’s custodial sentence as well as 
order for corporal punishment on the basis of his terminal medical 
condition.69 
26 Law in the reports aside, what about law in action? What 
evidence do we have of perspective-taking by judges? Consider the 
Australian magistrate in the trenches “[d]ealing with, [he supposed], 
that personal interaction with people where you actually need to find a 
whole lot of different skills as how to appease people, how to manage 
their problems, how to make them feel comfortable … rather than being 
able to be the ‘authority’ in those situations – ‘don’t speak to me like that 
in my court’ usually inflamed the situation. So [he tends] to be more of a 
mediator, or a counsellor … and take the heat out of the situation, which 
isn’t part of the legal skill – it’s just more of a survival skill”.70 The 
humanity involved in judicial decision-making is returned to the fore in 
the following comment: “because you’re actually talking to the person 
rather than to his counsel it makes it all the more acute, that sense of 
feeling sympathy for the person, but you’re not allowed to let that 
sympathy get in the way of what you do”.71 
27 The above examples are merely a sampling of a potentially deep 
and wide lake of judicial perspective-taking. The discussion could go on 
ad infinitum (or, from the perspective of opponents, ad nauseum). It is 
true that there will be instances where empathy is not required to 
inform the factual matrix or does not add to the legal analysis, but given 
that the above-mentioned examples are taken from a broad spectrum of 
the law, one could assert that empathy is very often an ingredient of 
proper as well as popular judicial decision-making.72 
28 Based on this working definition, therefore, empathy is about 
process rather than outcome. It is strictu senso about the capacity to put 
one’s self in someone else’s shoes. There are two consequences of taking 
this position. First, by saying that empathy is solely about perspective-
                                                          
69 Chng Yew Chin v Public Prosecutor [2006] 4 SLR 124 at [50] and [61]. 
70 Sharyn Roach & Kathy Mack, “Magistrates’ Everyday Work and Emotional 
Labour” (2005) 32 Journal of Law and Society 590 at 607–608. 
71 Sharyn Roach & Kathy Mack, “Magistrates’ Everyday Work and Emotional 
Labour” (2005) 32 Journal of Law and Society 590 at 611. 
72 Thomas Colby, “In Defence of Judicial Empathy” (2012) 96 Minn L Rev 1945 
at 1983. 
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taking, supporters are expressly or impliedly distinguishing cognitive 
from affective empathy, with their preference for the former. Second, 
what one does with the information gained through empathising is 
deemed a separate issue altogether. Employed in this manner, empathy 
may be easily distinguished from sympathy. As Colby puts it succinctly, 
“to sympathise is the feel for someone; to empathise is to feel with 
them… to empathise with others … is simply to understand things from 
their perspective and to be able to sense what they are feeling” 
[emphasis in original].73 In both cases, the underlying motivation is to 
dispel the suggestion that empathy as defined entails a predisposition or 
determinate outcome.74 
IV. Problems of and solutions to empathic judicial decision-
making 
29 Critics say that adopting perspective-taking as judicial 
empathy’s standard-bearer is misleading: there is growing consensus 
that the cognitive and affective are not distinct but overlapping traits of 
empathy, and that it is by no means unanimous that emphatic 
perspective-taking can be divorced from conduct.75 It has been 
suggested that it is simply impossible to inhibit otherwise natural 
emotive responses in judicial decision-making.76 The disagreement is 
not merely a matter of semantics or theory. By saying that empathy is 
not about feeling for someone and has no necessary link to outcomes, 
opponents are denied the opportunity of accusing proponents of 
empathy as back-dooring bias into the judicial decision-making process. 
                                                          
73 Thomas Colby, “In Defence of Judicial Empathy” (2012) 96 Minn L Rev 1945 
at 1959. 
74 Thomas Colby, “In Defence of Judicial Empathy” (2012) 96 Minn L Rev 1945 
at 1959; see also Susan A Bandes, “Empathetic Judging and the Rule of Law” [2009] 
Cardozo Law Review De Novo 133 at 136: 
Empathy is a capacity … It differs from sympathy or compassion … Empathy 
entails understanding another’s perspective. Sympathy is a feeling for or with 
the object of the emotion. Empathy does not require, or necessarily lead to, 
sympathy. Empathy, unlike sympathy, does not necessarily lead to action on 
behalf of its object, or the desire to take action on his behalf … [references 
omitted] 
 and Susan A Bandes, “Empathy and Article III: Judge Weinstein, Cases and 
Controversies” (2015) 64 DePaul L Rev 317 at 320. 
75 See Thomas Colby, “In Defence of Judicial Empathy” (2012) 96 Minn L Rev 1945 
at 1958. This point draws inspiration from Frans B M de Waal, “Putting Altruism 
Back into Altruism: The Evolution of Empathy” (2008) 59 Annu Rev Psychol 279 
at 285: empathy is perspective-taking combined with emotional engagement). 
76 Jill D Weinberg & Laura Beth Nielson, “Examining Empathy: Discrimination, 
Experience, and Judicial Decisionmaking” (2012) 85 S Cal L Rev 313. 
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30 Such arguments fit snugly with that line of research which, 
rooted in the legal realism movement, suggests a direct correlation 
between a judge’s personal characteristics and the outcome of a case. 
Thus, for example, a judge on the political right is likely partisan and to 
rule in favour of a litigant championing a conservative cause.77 Judges 
might likewise side with litigants who belong to the same 
socio-economic class.78 Gender stereotypes are also common 
accusations, in that a male judge renders a more sympathetic verdict in 
rape cases.79 UK Supreme Court Deputy President Baroness Hale (as she 
then was) alluded to this point when she said a male colleague in the 
House of Lords “referred to [her] ‘unique insight into these issues’ – 
quite what he meant by that [she does] not know. [She is] sure he meant 
it as a compliment. [She hopes] that he meant that [she] was unique in 
bringing the perspective of a woman, who had been a girl, and had 
spent most of [her] life working in areas of law relating to women and 
children. But of course [she is] by no means unique in any of that”.80 
Other studies hint that a Caucasian judge is likely, in the presence of a 
fellow Caucasian victim, likely to discriminate against a black accused.81 
Such attitudes are prevalent and insidious: “stereotypical associations 
[are] so subtle that people who hold them might not even be aware of 
them”.82 The gist of the concern is that being empathic is simply another 
word for unduly favouring the party in the litigation process whose 
perspective has, as a result, been taken. 
31 In this vein, frets Henderson:83 
The reality of empathy is that we are more likely to empathize with 
people similar to ourselves, and that such empathic understanding 
                                                          
77 Robert M Howard & Jeffrey A Segal, “A Preference for Deference? – The Supreme 
Court and Judicial Review” (2004) 57 Political Research Quarterly 131; Jeffrey 
A Segal & Harold J Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited 
(Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
78 Michele Benedetto Neitz, “Socioeconomic Bias in the Judiciary” (2013) 61 Clev St 
L Rev 137. 
79 Christina L Boyd, Lee Epstein & Andrew D Martin, “Untangling the Causal Effects 
of Sex on Judging” (2010) 54 American Journal of Political Science 389. 
80 Lady Hale, “It’s a Man’s World: Redressing the Balance”, speech at Norfolk Law 
Lecture 2012, University of East Anglia (16 February 2012). Her Ladyship was 
referring to R v G [2009] 1 AC 92, involving a case of statutory rape. 
81 Jonathan P Kastellec, Race, Context, and Judging on the Courts of Appeals: Race-
Based Panel Effects in Death Penalty Cases (26 July 2016). 
82 Jeffrey J Rachlinski, Sheri Johnson, Andrew J Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, “Does 
Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?” (2008–2009) 84 Notre Dame 
L Rev 1195. 
83 Lynne Henderson, “Legality and Empathy” (1987) 85 Mich L Rev 1574 at 1584; see 
also Darrell A H Miller, “Iqbal and Empathy” (2010) 78 U Mo-Kan City L Rev 999 
at 1010. The same as much is suggested in Adam N Glynn & Maya Sen, 
“Identifying Judicial Empathy: Does Having Daughters Cause Judges to Rule for 
Women’s Issues?” (2015) 59 American Journal of Political Science 37. 
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may be so automatic that it goes unnoticed: elites will empathize with 
the experiences of elites, men empathize with men, women with 
women, whites with whites. I would call this ‘unreflective’ empathy … 
[references omitted] 
According to Klaus Mathis and Fabian Diriwächter, this unreflective 
empathy is embedded in the system 1 biases which plague our decision-
making processes. By way of example, they raise the “familiarity bias” in 
which we are more likely to empathise with members of the same group 
or people with characteristics in common as ourselves,84 as neatly 
encapsulated in the categories enunciated in the preceding paragraph. 
32 Yet, even if true, it is not all bad. Ho extolled the virtue of 
emphatic concerns reflected in outcomes: “[a]ll else being equal the 
greater the empathic care the [judge] has for the accused, the more it 
will pain her to convict him of a crime he did not do, and consequently, 
the more it will take to convince her to return a guilty verdict”.85 
Although he made this observation in the context of criminal trials, 
there is nothing inherently objectionable to applying this to civil 
matters, or indeed, taking into account any and all stakeholders in the 
justice system. As if to emphasise the point, Brett Kavanaugh exhorted 
of fellow judges that “[w]e must walk in the shoes of the other judges, 
the lawyers, and the parties. It is important to understand [all parties], 
to keep our emotions in check, and be calm amidst the storm. To put it 
in the vernacular: to be a good umpire and a good judge, don’t be 
a jerk”.86 
33 It is a red herring to debate whether emotions ought to be 
excluded from judicial decision-making. Perhaps what is needed is an 
acknowledgment that judges are emotive creatures, like the rest of us, 
and that their empathic perspective-taking and empathic concern not 
only do play a part but may also have a legitimate role in judicial 
decision-making.87 The crux of the matter, then, is whether empathy’s 
potential for excesses may be sufficiently controlled. In other words, the 
challenge is policing the line between enabling empathy to improve 
judicial decision-making processes, and where it renders the outcome 
liable to criticisms of bias. 
                                                          
84 Klaus Mathis & Fabian Diriwächter, “Is the Rationality of Judicial Judgements 
Jeopardised by Cognitive Biases and Empathy?” in Efficiency, Sustainability and 
Justice to Future Generations (Klaus Mathis ed) (Springer, 2011) at p 69. 
85 Ho Hock Lai, “Virtuous Deliberation on the Criminal Verdict” in Law, Virtue and 
Justice (Amalia Amaya & Ho Hock Lai eds) (Hart Publishing, 2013) at p 252. 
86 Brett M Kavanaugh, “The Judge as Umpire: Ten Principles” (2016) 65 Cath U 
L Rev 683 at 689. 
87 Terry A Maroney, “The Emotionally Intelligent Judge: A New (and Realistic) 
Ideal” (2013) 49 Court Review 100 at 110. 
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34 Mathis and Diriwächter summarised the position succinctly:88 
[C]onscious analysis of the intentions and interests of the parties and 
one’s own prejudices is, on the one hand, an indispensable prerequisite 
for a judgment that fulfils its intended function, namely, to bring 
about reconciliation between the competing interests of the parties to 
the proceedings. On the other hand, the empathetic judge is also 
accountable for the effects of this process on his own emptions. 
Empathy in the application of law does not therefore mean that judges 
allow private intentions, interests and prejudices to surreptitiously 
influence their judgment directly or even to take the place of 
judgment. On the contrary, they should enable judges to develop and 
preserve the necessary conscious distance between the aims of the 
parties and the judges’ own feelings. 
35 If we say emphatic perspective-taking is good judicial decision-
making, then good judgments ought to reflect the role empathy plays. If 
we agree that emotion cannot be excluded from judicial decision-
making, then it would require collective selective amnesia for the entire 
judicial institution not to mention it. Judges ought to forthrightly 
account (to themselves, at the very least) for empathic perspective-
taking, how they have sought to guard against – for instance – unwanted 
emotional contagion, and therefore how adopting an empathic attitude 
has affected their decision. The important lesson, Ho contended, is that 
while “[w]e often praise dispassionate dispensation of justice. It seems to 
me this is best read to mean not that justice should be dispensed without 
any empathic care for anyone at all but that empathic care should not be 
unfairly distributed when dispensing justice”.89 It is only through an 
express judicial rendering of empathy into the words of a judgment can 
it truly be scrutinised and made accountable to the public, rendering 
both the subjective decision-making process and its objective outcome 
justifiable. Once again, as with the first point, this solution is only viable 
if the judge is even aware of the role empathy plays in his decision-
making process. 
V. Judicial empathy: An empirical agenda 
36 If we believe that empathy is a virtue in judging, then empathic 
capacity ought to be a quality for those holding judicial office. Yet, what 
hampers this agenda (and, at the same time, revealing the potential for 
                                                          
88 Klaus Mathis & Fabian Diriwächter, “Is the Rationality of Judicial Judgements 
Jeopardised by Cognitive Biases and Empathy?” in Efficiency, Sustainability and 
Justice to Future Generations (Klaus Mathis ed) (Springer, 2011) at pp 69–70. 
89 Ho Hock Lai, “Virtuous Deliberation on the Criminal Verdict” in Law, Virtue and 
Justice (Amalia Amaya & Ho Hock Lai eds) (Hart Publishing, 2013) at p 251; see 
also Terry A Maroney, “The Emotionally Intelligent Judge: A New (and Realistic) 
Ideal” (2013) 49 Court Review 100 at 110. 
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future research in the field of judicial decision-making) is the sore lack 
of empirics:90 only a clutch of studies – in the US, Australia, and 
Sweden – have thus far been conducted linking emotions to judicial 
behaviour. These studies are important and path-breaking: one assessed 
the impact of allowing victims of crimes to have a voice in the 
courtroom through victim impact statements;91 a second qualitatively 
highlighted the emotional burden judges carry in dealing with ordinary 
litigants;92 and a third focused on methodology for data collection.93 
Others have suggested that the next steps ought to be to contextualise 
data collection, perhaps contrasting emotional responses in the 
civil/criminal law context, appellate versus trial, when judges work 
individually or collectively, or in an inquisitorial or adversarial 
environment: “[c]omparative work might yield important insights into 
the role of culturally divergent social constructions of judging”.94 While 
much of the legal literature focuses on appellate courts in the judicial 
hierarchy, it is perhaps unsurprising that the empirical work focuses on 
trial courts and judges in the middle and lower tiers of the Judiciary: 
these are the officers in the proverbial trenches, exposed on a daily basis 
to the raw emotions of the everyday man, hearing the great bulk of all 
matters that go through the judicial process. There is a pressing need to 
understand and regulate the role of emotion in the incidence of greatest 
impact for the greatest number of people in the dispensation of justice. 
37 To the above, a further two points may be added. First, how can 
we know whether a judge is or can be empathic? Is it possible to separate 
the empathic wheat from the psychopathic chaff? There are simply as 
many tests for empathic aptitude as there are definitions of empathy, and 
for that same reason, one must proceed cautiously in understanding the 
kind of test that might be suitable for such needs. There are 
measurement scales which test for only cognitive empathy,95 or those for 
purely the affective variant.96 Others measure empathy in the sense of it 
                                                          
90 This point is clearly echoed in Terry A Maroney & James J Gross, “The Ideal of the 
Dispassionate Judge: An Emotion Regulation Perspective” (2014) 6 Emotion 
Review 142 at 148. 
91 Mary Lay Schuster & Amy Propen, “Degrees of Emotion: Judicial Responses to 
Victim Impact Statements” (2010) 6 Law, Culture and the Humanities 75. 
92 Sharyn Roach & Kathy Mack, “Magistrates’ Everyday Work and Emotional 
Labour” (2005) 32 Journal of Law and Society 590. 
93 Sharyn Roach Anleu, Stina Bergman Blix, Kathy Mack & Åsa Wettergren, 
“Observing Judicial Work and Emotions: Using Two Researchers” (2016) 
16 Qualitative Research 375. 
94 Terry A Maroney & James J Gross, “The Ideal of the Dispassionate Judge: An 
Emotion Regulation Perspective” (2014) 6 Emotion Review 142 at 148. 
95 Robert Hogan, “Development of an Empathy Scale” (1969) 33 Journal of 
Consulting and Clinical Psychology 307. 
96 Albert Mehrabian & Norman Epstein, “A Measure of Emotional Empathy” (1972) 
40 Journal of Personality 525. 
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as an umbrella term encompassing sympathy or compassion.97 If the 
intent is to test for a judge’s propensity towards perspective-taking, then 
the first type of test is suitable; but that presupposes an acceptance of the 
important and as-yet-not-established assumptions that cognitive and 
affective empathy can be distinguished, and there is no necessary link 
between empathy as a process and as an outcome. Perhaps like a broad-
spectrum antibiotic, the latter type of test is more suitable, as it gives a 
holistic picture of the cognitive and affective makeup of our judicial 
office-holder. Having more awareness that he is not only of his cognitive 
ability to step into the shoes of the other, but also of his propensity to 
emote in relation to that other, affords him at the very least the 
opportunity to minimise empathic corruption and to regulate empathic 
concern in a just manner towards all concerned by his judgment. No 
attempt has been made to measure the judicial propensity towards 
empathy, and yet such data could usefully inform both the factors 
involved as well as the outcome of any particular judicial decision in any 
given field. 
38 The second point flows from the preceding comment – is it 
possible to train98 judges to be or become empathic?99 Concomitantly, 
can we train judges to control the effect of empathy on decision-
making?100 A growing body of research posits that emotional contagion 
or affect in the emphatic process can be controlled, modified or 
inhibited cognitively. This is similar to the debiasing strategy adopted to 
counter cognitive biases in that both require the decision-maker to be 
                                                          
97 Darrick Joliffe & David P Farrington, “Development and Validation of the Basic 
Empathy Scale” (2006) 29 Journal of Adolescence 589. 
98 See generally Francy L Rubin, Margaret M Judd & Tali A Conine, “Empathy: Can 
It Be Learned and Retained?” (1977) 57 Physical Therapy 644 and Carol M Davis, 
“What Is Empathy, and Can Empathy Be Taught?” (1990) 70 Physical Therapy 707. 
99 A good example of judicial training in empathy is the session organised by the New 
York County Lawyers’ Association entitled, “The Role of Empathy in Judicial 
Decision Making” on 2 May 2013, available at http://www.nycla.org/PDF/ 
The%20Role%20of%20Empathy%20in%20Judicial.pdf (accessed 2 May 2016). This 
follows comments on embedding empathy training in professional judicial courses: 
see Terry A Maroney & James J Gross, “The Ideal of the Dispassionate Judge: An 
Emotion Regulation Perspective” (2014) 6 Emotion Review 142 at 150. 
100 Roman Krznaric, “The Empathy Effect: How Empathy Drives Common Values, 
Social Justice and Environmental Action” Friends of the Earth (March 2015)  
at endnote 98: “I have myself been involved in giving empathy training courses to 
UK Employment Tribunal judges”. <https://www.foe.co.uk/sites/default/files/ 
downloads/empathy-effect-roman-krznaric-76075.pdf> (accessed 2 May 2016); see 
also the New York County Lawyers’ Association Continuing Legal Education’s 
course: “The Role of Empathy in Judicial Decision Making” (2 May 2013) available 
at http://www.nycla.org/PDF/The%20Role%20of%20Empathy%20in%20Judicial.pdf 
(accessed 2 May 2016). 
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aware of the problem, and subsequently to take deliberate steps to 
protect his decisional processes from corruption.101 
39 Strategies include emotional suppression or anticipatory 
cognitive reappraisal.102 Emotional suppression takes a number of forms. 
For example, it might constitute denial in that the judge cognitively 
disengages from (that is, refuses to mentally admit to) his own 
emotional response or pretending that it is no longer being felt. The 
feeling, whether anger at a defendant mother accused of abandoning her 
child, or disgust at the hedonistic displays of an accused charged with 
acts of sadomasochism, is mentally suppressed. Emotion may also be 
behaviourally repressed, such as to inhibit expressions of emotion 
through behaviour – whether laughter or sadness or smiles or winces. 
Cognitive reappraisal, for instance, involves deliberately re-interpreting 
an emotional response such as to modify the intensity of the emotion 
felt. Applied to the judicial context, this involves the judge consciously 
attempting to be emotionally neutral in relation to possible emotional 
responses to a given stimulus (for instance, gruesome crime scene 
photographs, a victim crying, or an accused’s mea culpa), and, thus 
arriving at a similar emotional state as with expressive suppression. Both 
strategies can be reactive or anticipatory (that is, the judge mentally 
preparing himself for an expected emotional stimulus). Both strategies 
have as their object the distancing between the judge and his emotional 
state, such as to mute affective empathy, while retaining the benefits of 
cognitive empathy.103 Both strategies require the judge to be aware of the 
potential (negative) influence of emotion on the judicial decision-
making process. 
40 If so, how ought a judicial training programme to be structured? 
Could priming judges for perspective-taking be effective? Should we 
encourage judges to disclose their empathic responses, both during 
proceedings and in their judgments, as well as how they dealt with these 
selfsame responses? The key objectives in so doing include: raising 
                                                          
101 Timothy D Wilson, David B Centerbar & Nancy Brekke, “Mental Contamination 
and the Debiasing Problem” in Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive 
judgment (Thomas Gilovich, Dale W Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds) (Cambridge 
University Press, 2002) at p 191. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, “Rational 
Choice and the Framing of Decisions” (1986) 59 The Journal of Business S251 
at S274–S275. 
102 For an overview, see Terry A Maroney & James J Gross, “The Ideal of the 
Dispassionate Judge: An Emotion Regulation Perspective” (2014) 6 Emotion 
Review 142. 
103 See, eg, Patricia L Lockwood, Ana Seara-Cardoso & Essi Viding, “Emotion 
Regulation Moderates the Association between Empathy and Prosocial Behaviour” 
(2014) 9 PLoS One e96555. For an application in the judicial context, see  
Terry A Maroney, “Emotional Regulation and Judicial Behaviour” (2011) 
99 Cal L Rev 1485. 
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awareness of empathy as a judicial virtue, while guarding against its 
potential excesses; determining how to implement empathy in what 
must be the daily task of empathic engagement with courtroom 
stakeholders; and deciding the extent to which empathy is required by 
different areas of the law or enhances our understanding of the law. At 
the very least, engagement by judicial office-holders of this topic ought 
to generate the kind of open discussion on the role of empathy in 
judicial decision-making that it deserves,104 if it is to have an 
increasingly prominent place in our system of justice. 
VI. Conclusion 
41 Plato famously described a tribe of men, prisoners in the dark 
confines of a cave.105 From beyond a rocky wall is a fire that burns 
bright, offering potential comfort and illumination. The tribe is unable 
to see beyond the wall, perceiving only shadows and sounds, and willing 
themselves to believe that only shadows and sounds are real, and 
nothing else. There are those who escape the cave, and are able to 
comprehend the full reality of their situation. Some return to the cave to 
share in this truth, only to be persecuted by the tribe who cannot see 
the light. 
42 This article represents an emphatic plea to recognise the truths 
that emotion cannot and ought not to be excluded from judicial 
decision-making. Justice as fairness demands that all perspectives be 
taken into account by the judge, and impartiality demands that he 
confronts and deals with his emotions in the decision-making process in 
an honest and accountable manner. If the virtuous judge is the empathic 
judge, then it is not only time to start a conversation on this very topic, 
but to also recognise and train this virtue in those who hold this high 
office. 
 
                                                          
104 One possible outcome is to discuss whether Richard Posner was right in saying that 
“the internal perspective – the putting oneself in the other person’s shoes – that is 
achieved by the exercise of empathetic imagination lacks normative significance”: 
Richard A Posner, Overcoming Law (Harvard University Press, 1995) at p 381. 
105 Plato, “The Republic – Book VII: Allegory of the Cave” in Great Dialogues of Plato 
(W H D Rouse trans; Phillip Rouse & Eric H Warmington eds) (New American 
Library, 1956) at p 365. 
